Search results for " Collective Intentionality"

showing 3 items of 3 documents

The Role of Searle's Constitutive Rules for the Rational Criticizability of Institutional Reality

2013

My hypothesis is that we can derive the normative conditions that institutions and institutional acts have to meet in order to be rationally acceptable/recognizable from the logical structure of institutional reality. Developing Searle's achievements on the constitutive role of speech acts in the construction of institutional reality and on their character of institutional acts, I'll show that the same types of constitutive rules underlying illocutionary acts also underlie institutional reality. I’ll then argue that we can derive a specific set of normative criteria for the rational criticizability of institutional acts from these constitutive rules in the same way that we can derive normat…

Constitutive Rules Collective Intentionality Communication Criterion of Fairness Institutional Reality Searle Rawls HabermasSettore M-FIL/06 - Storia Della Filosofia
researchProduct

Social
 Ontology,
Collective 
Intentionality,
and
Mindreading

2013

Standard 
accounts 
of 
social 
reality 
take
collective
 intentionality 
as 
the starting 
point
 of
 the
 creation
 and
 maintenance
 of
 social
 facts.
 But 
collective intentionality 
is 
enabled, 
as
Searle
 suggests,
by
 a 
more 
basic
 capacity 
to 
understand 
another 
person
 as 
an 
agent
like 
oneself
 and
 as 
ready 
to 
engage 
in 
cooperative 
activities.
 We 
can 
coordinate 
our 
collective 
actions
 only
 insofar
 we
 are
 able
 to
 explain
 and
 predict
 the
 behavior
 of
 other
 persons,
 we
 can
 understand 
behavior 
only 
insofar
 we 
can
mindread
 them,
and 
we 
can 
mindread 
them
only
 if
 we
 assume
 the
 constitutive
 role
 of
 rationality
 in
 action.
 Therefore
…

mindreading collective intentionality simulation rationality BackgroundSettore M-FIL/06 - Storia Della Filosofia
researchProduct

Intenzionalità collettiva versus plural subject nel confronto tra Searle e Gilbert: influssi hobbesiani e rousseauiani nel dibattito contemporaneo su…

2019

At which conditions are we allowed to take a plurality of individuals as a collective or a social group? In this paper I address that question by considering the relationship between individuals and collectivity under the respect of the process by which the collectivity is being formed. I will take into account Margaret Gilbert’s theory of joint commitment and plural subject and John Searle’s theory of collective intentionality. In particular I will discuss their view on the phrase «individuals as a group», which bears an intrinsic tension between the individuals, treated as manifold and plural entities, and the group, treated as one singular entity. These theories do hold in common the att…

Individualism Collectivism plural subject joint commitment collective intentionalitySettore M-FIL/06 - Storia Della Filosofia
researchProduct